Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms explained, featuring Parliament Hill, Lady Justice, the Canadian flag, and constitutional rights.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What It Protects, Where It Falls Short, and How to Use It

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is often described as the document that guarantees Canadians their rights. That description is accurate as far as it goes, but it leaves out three things that matter in practice. The Charter protects particular rights against particular actors. Charter rights are powerful protections but not all are absolute, because section 1 generally lets governments justify reasonable limits and some guarantees carry their own qualifications. And a right the courts recognize is not the same thing as a right an ordinary person can enforce quickly, cheaply or in time to matter.

This article is written for Canadians who want to understand the Charter as a working legal tool rather than a slogan. It explains where the Charter came from, whom it binds, what it guarantees and how courts decide whether a limit is justified. It then uses decided cases to show what remedies actually look like, examines the gap between having a right and enforcing one, and sets out what the Charter does not protect. It closes with a practical guide to what to do if you believe a government has breached your rights. It is information, not legal advice, and it takes no side on which governments or policies are right.

Part I: What the Charter Is and Whom It Binds

Where the Charter came from

Canadians had legal rights long before 1982. The common law and ordinary statutes protected many of the interests the Charter later named, and the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 declared a list of fundamental freedoms. The Bill of Rights was, however, an ordinary federal statute that applied only to federal law, as the Library of Parliament explains. It could be changed like any other statute, and it did not reach provincial laws, which govern much of daily life.

Patriation, the process of bringing the Constitution fully under Canadian control, changed that. In 1981 the Supreme Court held that Ottawa could legally proceed without the provinces’ agreement, but that constitutional convention required some degree of provincial support. A compromise reached that November included the notwithstanding clause, discussed below, and the Constitution Act, 1982, which contains the Charter, came into force on April 17, 1982. The Library of Parliament’s account is a good short history.

The difference between a statute and an entrenched right is section 52, which makes the Constitution the supreme law of Canada and gives an inconsistent law no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency. Before 1982, the legislature had the last word on most rights questions. After it, courts could set aside laws that breach the Constitution and cannot be justified. Parliament and the provincial legislatures remain the lawmakers, with room to act through section 1 and the notwithstanding clause. Whether the balance now favours judges too much, or finally gives rights an independent enforcer, is a long-running debate that this article does not try to settle.

How the Charter works: sections 52 and 24

Two provisions explain most of what courts do with the Charter. Section 52, just described, allows a court to strike down or read down a law, which affects everyone. Section 24 allows a person whose rights have been infringed to apply to a court for a remedy that is appropriate and just, and section 24(2) deals with the exclusion of evidence obtained in breach of the Charter. That remedy affects mainly the person in the case.

In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., decided in 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Lord’s Day Act infringed freedom of religion because its purpose was religious, and that it was not saved by section 1. The Court also confirmed that a corporation charged under the Act could challenge it, and that when the challenge is to legislation, section 52 rather than section 24 is the operative provision. The Big M reasons are on the Court’s website.

Whom the Charter binds: section 32

Section 32 provides that the Charter applies to Parliament and the government of Canada, and to the legislatures and governments of the provinces. It does not apply to everyone. The more important point is that the question is not answered by a label. Whether a body is called public, or was created by statute, or receives public money, is not decisive on its own. The nature of the activity matters.

The Supreme Court’s framework in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) recognizes two routes. The first is where the actor is itself government, as with a legislature, a ministry or a municipality. The second is where a non-government entity is implementing a specific government policy or program, so that the particular activity, rather than the entity as a whole, is subject to the Charter. The Department of Justice’s Charterpedia entry on section 32 summarizes how this has worked out. Municipalities and Ontario public school boards are bound. Colleges have been held bound where the statute gives them governmental powers. Universities are generally not bound as institutions, although a particular activity can raise different questions. Hospitals are generally not bound as entities, but a specific measure that delivers a government program can be scrutinized, which is what happened in Eldridge. Private corporations are generally not bound by the Charter when acting in a private capacity.

The practical lesson is that a university decision, a hospital policy or a school board rule does not automatically attract Charter scrutiny just because a statute authorizes the institution to act. The first question is whether the specific act in dispute is governmental in nature.

What the Charter guarantees

The fundamental freedoms in section 2 are discussed in the next section. The Charter’s other major guarantees fall into five families, and knowing which family a problem belongs to is the first step in judging whether the Charter is relevant. The full wording is on the Government of Canada’s official consolidation.

Democratic rights. Section 3 gives every citizen the right to vote in federal and provincial elections and to stand for office. Sections 4 and 5 limit the life of a legislature to five years, with an exception for war or insurrection, and require it to sit at least once every twelve months. Section 3 also lies outside the reach of the notwithstanding clause.

Mobility rights. Section 6 contains two different guarantees. Section 6(1) gives citizens, and only citizens, the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada. Section 6(2) gives citizens and permanent residents the right to move to and live in any province and to pursue a livelihood there. That second guarantee is qualified. Section 6(3) allows laws of general application that do not discriminate on the basis of prior residence, and reasonable residency requirements for publicly provided social services, and section 6(4) allows programs that improve conditions in a province whose employment rate is below the national rate.

Legal rights. Sections 7 to 14 matter most to people who deal with police, courts or regulatory processes. Section 7 protects life, liberty and security of the person, and allows a deprivation only in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 8 protects against unreasonable search or seizure, which governs when police may search a home, a phone or digital records. Section 9 protects against arbitrary detention or imprisonment. Section 10 gives a person who is arrested or detained the right to be told the reasons promptly and to retain and instruct a lawyer without delay. Section 11 protects people charged with offences, including the rights to be tried within a reasonable time, to be presumed innocent and not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. Section 12 prohibits cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Section 13 protects a witness’s testimony from being used against that witness in another proceeding, and section 14 gives a party or witness who does not understand the language of the proceeding, or who is deaf, the right to an interpreter. These rights are usually litigated inside a criminal case, where the typical remedies are the exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings, discussed in Part II.

Equality rights. Section 15(1) says every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. The words “in particular” are why courts have recognized further, analogous grounds beyond the listed ones. Equality under the Charter does not mean identical treatment. Courts distinguish formal equality, the same rule for everyone, from substantive equality, which asks whether a rule that looks neutral nevertheless creates or deepens disadvantage for a group. The Supreme Court described this approach, and the two-step inquiry into distinctions based on enumerated or analogous grounds, in Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), decided in 2020. Section 15(2) also allows programs aimed at improving the conditions of disadvantaged groups. Proof matters. In R. v. Sharma, decided in 2022, a majority of the Supreme Court held that limits on conditional sentences did not breach section 15 because the claimants had not shown that they disproportionately affected Indigenous offenders.

Language and education rights. Sections 16 to 22 make English and French the official languages of Canada, with equal status in federal institutions, and protect the public’s right to deal with federal offices in either language in specified circumstances. Section 23 gives citizens whose first language learned is the English or French minority language of their province, or who received their primary schooling in Canada in that language, the right to have their children taught in it, where numbers warrant. Section 23 is one of the issues in the Bill 21 appeal discussed in Part III.

Personal autonomy and section 7

Section 7 is sometimes described as protecting personal autonomy, and in some settings it does. The Court has held that a criminal prohibition on abortion violated security of the person (Morgentaler) and that an absolute prohibition on assisted dying violated section 7 for a defined group of competent adults (Carter). Neither decision creates an unlimited right to make every personal or economic decision free of regulation. Section 7 applies only when life, liberty or security of the person is affected and the deprivation offends the principles of fundamental justice, and section 1 remains available to governments. Ordinary medical consent is a separate matter, governed mainly by the common law and provincial legislation. The Charter becomes relevant when a law or government decision restricts a person’s choices in a way that engages section 7.

The fundamental freedoms in practice

The fundamental freedoms are the rights people most often invoke in public debates, and they are also the most commonly misunderstood. Each one is broad in what it covers and limited in what it guarantees.

Expression. Section 2(b) protects expression widely, including speech that is unpopular, offensive or disliked by most people. Protection at the first stage does not mean immunity from every limit. In Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, decided in 2013, the Supreme Court considered a provincial human rights provision aimed at publications that expose people to hatred. The provision was found to infringe expression and religious freedom. The Court upheld the part of the provision that prohibits expression exposing people to hatred, and it struck the words prohibiting expression that “ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of” a protected group, because those words were not a justified limit. The Court’s docket record sets out the answers. Government may restrict a narrow category of extreme expression, but offensiveness alone does not justify a limit. The Charter also restrains what governments may prohibit, not what private publishers, platforms or employers choose to host or tolerate.

Peaceful assembly. Section 2(c) protects peaceful assembly, which is distinct from expression. Government keeps real authority over public spaces, safety and unlawful conduct, so the question is usually whether a restriction is tailored enough to be justified. The freedom was tested in COVID-19 gathering limits and again in the Emergencies Act litigation, both discussed in Part III.

Religion and conscience. Section 2(a) protects both religious and non-religious conscience. A generally applicable law can still burden a religious practice. In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the Supreme Court assumed that a universal photo requirement for driver’s licences interfered with the religious beliefs of a Hutterite community, and then upheld the requirement under section 1 by a 4 to 3 vote. Religious freedom is again central in the challenge to Quebec’s Bill 21, which is before the Supreme Court and is discussed in Part III.

Association. Section 2(d) protects the right to join with others, including in labour relations. In Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, decided in 2015, a majority of the Supreme Court held that a statutory prohibition on strikes by designated essential services employees substantially interfered with meaningful collective bargaining and infringed section 2(d), and that the limit was not justified because the scheme was not minimally impairing. Two justices dissented in part, taking the view that the courts should not constitutionalize a right to strike. The reasons are on the Court’s website.

Section 1 and the Oakes test

Charter rights are powerful protections, but their exercise can be subject to justified limits and qualifications. Section 1 guarantees the rights “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” In R. v. Oakes, decided in 1986, the Supreme Court set out the framework courts still use. The government must show that the law has a pressing and substantial objective. It must then show proportionality, which has three parts: a rational connection between the law and the objective, minimal impairment of the right, and a proportionate balance between the benefits of the law and its harmful effects. The Oakes reasons are on the Court’s website.

The wording of Oakes on minimal impairment speaks of impairing the right “as little as possible,” and it is sometimes read as requiring the least restrictive measure imaginable. Later decisions do not apply it that strictly. In Hutterian Brethren, the majority said that the government is not required to choose the least restrictive means. The question is whether the alternatives would achieve the government’s objective in a real and substantial manner, and courts give legislatures a measure of deference in choosing among reasonable options, especially in complex social policy. That deference is itself debated, and the dissent in Hutterian Brethren argued that it dilutes the test. The point for readers is that section 1 is neither a rubber stamp nor an automatic strike-down mechanism. It is a structured argument that governments sometimes win and sometimes lose.

Both outcomes appear in the cases already mentioned. The Lord’s Day Act in Big M and the essential services scheme in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour failed at section 1. The photo requirement in Hutterian Brethren and the narrowed hate speech prohibition in Whatcott survived. More recently, in Taylor v. Newfoundland and Labrador, decided in February 2026, the Supreme Court considered a pandemic-era travel restriction. According to the Court’s own case summary, it found that the restriction infringed mobility rights and was justified under section 1, although the justices divided over how to read section 6.

The notwithstanding clause, section 25 and section 35

Section 33, the notwithstanding clause, allows Parliament or a provincial legislature to declare expressly that an Act operates notwithstanding a provision in section 2 or in sections 7 to 15 of the Charter. A declaration expires five years after it takes effect and can be re-enacted. The clause therefore does not reach democratic rights, mobility rights or language rights. That limit was visible in Working Families Coalition (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General), decided in March 2025, where Ontario had used section 33 in connection with section 2(b), but the Supreme Court still found that the third-party advertising spending limit infringed the democratic right in section 3 and was invalid. That much is settled.

Several other questions are not. One is whether section 28, which guarantees the Charter’s rights equally to male and female persons “notwithstanding anything in this Charter,” limits what section 33 can do. Another is whether courts can still make declarations about a law protected by a section 33 declaration. Both are before the Supreme Court in the Bill 21 appeal and, on declaratory relief, in the Saskatchewan appeal, and neither has been decided. Our standalone article, The Notwithstanding Clause (Section 33), covers the clause in full, so this article does not repeat that analysis.

Sections 25 and 35 are sometimes confused with each other, and they do not work the same way. Section 25 is part of the Charter and is a rule of interpretation: the Charter’s guarantees are not to be read so as to abrogate or derogate from Aboriginal, treaty or other rights of Indigenous peoples. Section 35 is in a different part of the Constitution Act, 1982. It recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal and treaty rights as rights in their own right, with their own legal tests. Section 25 shapes how Charter rights are read in a dispute. Section 35 is a separate source of rights.

Part II: What the Cases Show About Enforcement

Several principles affect whether a successful claim helps the person who brings it.

Winning can mean invalidity, but not always immediately

The most dramatic Charter outcome is that a law is struck down. In R. v. Morgentaler, decided in 1988, the Supreme Court held that the abortion provisions in section 251 of the Criminal Code violated section 7’s guarantee of security of the person and were not justified under section 1. In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), decided in 2015, the Court unanimously held that the Criminal Code prohibitions on physician-assisted dying infringed section 7 as they applied to a competent adult who clearly consents and has a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering. The Carter reasons did not simply overrule the earlier decision in Rodriguez, which the Court treated as distinguishable, and said that changes in the legal framework and the evidence justified revisiting the question.

Invalidity does not always take effect at once. The Court in Carter suspended its declaration for 12 months so that Parliament could respond. When the federal government asked for more time, the Court in 2016 extended the suspension by four months, less than the six requested, and by a 5 to 4 majority allowed people to apply to a superior court for an exemption in the meantime. In Eldridge, the Court held that failing to fund sign language interpretation for deaf patients in hospitals breached section 15, and it suspended the declaration for six months. A suspended declaration respects the legislature’s role, but the person who won may still wait. The Carter claimants also received special costs on a full indemnity basis against Canada, with British Columbia bearing a share of the trial costs. That award is unusual, and it shows how costly this kind of litigation is when it is not covered.

Winning can mean a remedy that depends on the proceeding

For an accused person, the most important Charter remedies are tied to the criminal case itself. In R. v. Jordan, decided in 2016, the Supreme Court set presumptive ceilings for the time between charge and the end of trial: 18 months in provincial court and 30 months in superior court, with defence delay deducted. Mr. Jordan’s net delay was 44 months, so the Court set aside his convictions and entered a stay of proceedings. A stay protects the accused but also ends the prosecution, so remedies can carry costs beyond the parties.

The remedy for an unreasonable search is different. In R. v. Spencer, decided in 2014, the Court held that police had no authority to ask an internet provider for subscriber information without a warrant or other lawful authority, and that doing so was a search that breached section 8. Even so, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), after weighing the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on the accused’s protected interests and society’s interest in a trial on the merits, and the conviction for possession stood. The Spencer reasons are on the Court’s website. In R. v. Grant, the leading section 24(2) decision, the Court described the exclusion of evidence as aimed at the long-term reputation of the justice system, not at punishing police or compensating the accused. A person can establish a breach and still see the evidence admitted.

Winning does not usually mean compensation

Damages for a Charter breach are possible but are not automatic. In Vancouver (City) v. Ward, decided in 2010, the Supreme Court set out a four-step approach: a breach must be shown, damages must serve a function such as compensation, vindication or deterrence, countervailing considerations are weighed, and the amount is assessed. Mr. Ward received 5,000 dollars from the province for an unjustified strip search. The 100-dollar damages award against the city for the seizure of his car was set aside, and a declaration under section 24(1) was substituted.

The Court was more restrictive where the breach is the enactment of a law. In Power v. Canada (Attorney General), decided in 2024 by a 5 to 4 majority, the Court held that damages for passing legislation later found unconstitutional are available only in narrow circumstances, such as where the law was clearly unconstitutional, or the government acted in bad faith or abused its power. The Court’s summary of the decision explains the test. A person harmed by a law that is later struck down will often receive a declaration of invalidity but not compensation for the period in which the law applied.

Democratic rights and the limits of section 33

Voting rights show the Charter at its strongest. In Sauve v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), decided in 2002, a narrow Supreme Court majority struck down the denial of the vote to prisoners serving sentences of two years or more. The Crown conceded a breach of section 3, and the limit failed under section 1. In Working Families, the Court struck down Ontario’s spending limit on third-party advertising in the year before an election, with a majority led by Justice Karakatsanis and a dissent led by the Chief Justice and Justice Moreau. The Court’s summary shows that this protection is among the few that the notwithstanding clause cannot reach.

Part III: Contemporary Cases and the Enforcement Gap

COVID-19 restrictions: a range of outcomes

The pandemic cases produced varied results: some challenges failed under section 1, some succeeded, and some were dismissed because the measures had expired.

In Beaudoin v. British Columbia, decided in March 2021, the British Columbia Supreme Court found that the temporary limits on in-person worship infringed section 2 but were reasonable and proportionate, and so justified under section 1. It also granted one petitioner, Mr. Beaudoin, a declaration, which the province had conceded, that orders prohibiting outdoor protests between November 2020 and February 2021 infringed his freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. The Court of Appeal dismissed the churches’ appeal in December 2022 and dismissed Mr. Beaudoin’s as moot, because nothing then prevented anyone from protesting outdoors. The Supreme Court refused leave in the churches’ case in August 2023. In Spencer v. Canada (Health), the Federal Court in 2021 refused to suspend the federal hotel quarantine requirement while the challenge proceeded, and later dismissed the challenges.

Hillier v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 259, went the other way, on a narrower question. Randy Hillier challenged Ontario’s spring 2021 gathering limits, which he had been charged with breaching by attending outdoor political protests. Ontario conceded that the limits restricted peaceful assembly, so the only issue was whether they were justified under section 1. The application judge said they were, but a unanimous Court of Appeal disagreed in a judgment released on April 7, 2025. The limits, in effect from April 17 to May 22, 2021, allowed some gatherings, such as weddings, funerals and religious services, subject to caps on numbers, but banned assemblies for political protest outright. Ontario had not shown that it considered an exception for peaceful protest, so the limits were not justified. The Court wrote that “the Constitution does not fade from view in times of crisis.”

The remedy came in a later addendum, 2025 ONCA 396. The regulations had by then been revoked, so there was nothing to strike down. Instead, according to a published summary of the addendum (2025 ONCA 396), the Court read the regulations down so that the prohibition did not apply to gatherings for the purpose of peaceful assembly and protest of up to 10 people. Striking down removes a provision altogether, while reading down keeps the provision in force and removes only the part that cannot stand. That respects the legislature’s work as far as possible, and it suits a challenge aimed at a missing exception rather than at gathering limits as such. The decision did not invalidate Ontario’s pandemic restrictions generally. As a lesson in accountability it is both encouraging and sobering. A court held a province to the Charter even in an emergency, but did so four years after the events, once the regulations had expired.

In Taylor v. Newfoundland and Labrador, by contrast, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a travel restriction that had long expired and set aside the mootness ruling made below, so whether a court will decide a challenge to an expired measure depends on the court and the facts.

The Emergencies Act litigation

The litigation over the 2022 declaration of a public order emergency has several layers, and they are often confused. First, the Public Order Emergency Commission was a public inquiry, not a court. In February 2023 Commissioner Rouleau reported that the threshold for invoking the Act was met, a conclusion that did not bind any court. Second, the Federal Court, in a decision released on January 23, 2024, held the declaration unreasonable and without legal authority under the statute, and found Charter breaches in the measures taken under it. Third, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2026 FCA 6, decided on January 16, 2026, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the government’s appeals.

The Court of Appeal’s findings should be read precisely. It held that the government had not shown reasonable grounds to believe that a national emergency, as the Act defines it, existed, so the invocation was unreasonable and outside the statute. It held that the Regulations, which made taking part in certain protests an offence whether or not the peace was breached, infringed freedom of expression and were not justified under section 1. It held that two provisions of the separate Economic Order, which required financial institutions to disclose to the RCMP and CSIS, without a warrant or prior authorization, property they had reason to believe was connected to a designated person, and which allowed related information to be shared in the other direction, were unreasonable searches under section 8. It did not hold that every account freeze was unconstitutional, and it found that the provision authorizing freezes did not itself authorize a search or seizure. The Federal Court had rejected a section 2(c) claim. The cross-appeal on that point was dismissed without costs, the Court of Appeal saying that the section 2(b) breach sufficiently accounted for the claim and that it should not be understood as agreeing with the Federal Court’s section 2(c) analysis. The Court’s plain-language summary and full reasons are on its website.

The litigation continues. The Supreme Court granted the government leave to appeal on October 22, 2026, and also granted leave on the cross-appeal brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Canadian Constitution Foundation. As of November 15, 2026, no hearing date had been set on the Court’s docket. Under its schedule, the government’s factum is due on February 1, 2027 and the interveners’ factums on May 10, 2027. The proclamation was revoked on February 23, 2022, so the events will be more than five years old when the Supreme Court decides.

Bill 21 and the Saskatchewan pronoun policy

Quebec’s Act respecting the laicity of the State, known as Bill 21, prohibits certain public-sector workers, including public school teachers, from wearing religious symbols at work, and it was passed in 2019 with a pre-emptive section 33 declaration. A Quebec Superior Court judgment exempted English-language school boards from parts of it under the minority-language education right in section 23, but the Quebec Court of Appeal overturned that exemption in February 2024 and upheld the law. The Supreme Court heard the appeal, English Montreal School Board v. Attorney General of Quebec, from March 23 to 26, 2026, and judgment is reserved. The Court’s docket showed no judgment as of November 15, 2026. The appeal raises section 33, section 28, section 23 and declaratory relief, and the Court has decided none of them.

The Saskatchewan case, Government of Saskatchewan v. UR Pride Centre for Sexuality and Gender Diversity, concerns the province’s use of section 33 to protect a school law on students’ names and pronouns, after the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision in 2025. Leave to appeal was granted in November 2025, factums have been filed, and the docketshowed no hearing date as of November 15, 2026.

The enforcement gap

A constitutional right may be legally enforceable while remaining difficult for an ordinary individual to enforce quickly or affordably. The cases above show how that happens.

The first problem is timing. A restriction that lasts weeks or months can be challenged only after it has begun, and the final answer may arrive years later. In Hillier the limits ended in May 2021 and the appeal was decided in April 2025. The Emergencies Act proclamation lasted days, and the appeal has not yet been heard. A court can declare that an expired measure was unconstitutional, but that declaration cannot undo what the measure prevented.

The second problem is prevention versus remedy. Courts can sometimes stop a measure before it takes effect by granting an interim injunction or stay. In general the test asks whether there is a serious issue to be tried, whether the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if relief is refused, and where the balance of convenience lies, taking the public interest into account. A stronger showing is required at the first step for some orders, such as an injunction that compels a positive act, and courts apply the framework with some variation. It is not easily met when the government says it is acting in the public interest, as the refusal to suspend the hotel quarantine in Spencer v. Canada (Health) illustrates. Most ordinary claimants will litigate after the fact instead.

The third problem is the content of the remedy. A declaration confirms a breach but does not pay for it. A suspended declaration lets the unconstitutional law continue for a period. Damages need a separate showing and are restricted where the breach is legislation. An evidence exclusion helps only someone who is already a defendant. A stay ends the case but does not repair earlier harm. And a read-down, as in Hillier, corrects the law without returning what the measure took.

The fourth problem is cost. Carter succeeded with substantial resources and expert evidence, which most people will not have. Public interest litigants can sometimes get special costs rules, and the Court Challenges Program funds some test cases, but these are exceptions.

Part IV: What the Charter Does Not Protect

Property and economic liberty

The Charter contains no general guarantee of private property. Proposals to entrench one were dropped in the early 1980s, with some provinces and the NDP resisting, as the Library of Parliament’s history records. That does not leave property unprotected. Government conduct involving property can engage other Charter rights, such as protection against unreasonable search and seizure in section 8, or liberty and security of the person in section 7 when the effects on a person are serious. Property is also protected by statute, by the common law, and by expropriation legislation that sets out notice and compensation rules. The federal Canadian Bill of Rights refers to the enjoyment of property, but it applies only to federal law.

Section 7 does not work as a general guarantee of economic liberty either. According to the Department of Justice’s Charterpedia entry on section 7, the Supreme Court has treated purely commercial interests as outside it. In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), the Court held that a corporation cannot rely on section 7, because that section protects the human element of life, liberty and security, although it left open that section 7 might protect economic rights fundamental to human survival. Corporations are not shut out of the Charter altogether. The same company in Irwin Toy invoked freedom of expression, and the Court held that the restrictions on advertising to children infringed it, but were justified under section 1. Whether a particular right is available to a corporation depends on the right.

Private conduct

As explained in Part I, the Charter does not govern private conduct. A private employer who dismisses a worker for social media posts, a platform that moderates content and a private landlord are not bound by it. Other law applies to them, including contract, employment standards, human rights and privacy legislation, and the right forum is often a human rights tribunal, a labour arbitrator, a privacy commissioner or a civil court.

Taxation and pseudolaw

The Charter does not exempt anyone from tax. Arguments that individuals are “sovereign” and outside the tax system have been rejected repeatedly. In Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, an Alberta judge explained why such pseudolegal arguments have no legal effect. Be wary of anyone who promises that a document or declaration will remove you from the law.

Part V: A Practical Guide if You Think Your Rights Have Been Breached

There is no single national Charter complaint body. A complaint to a government department will not become a Charter claim just because you use the word, and many problems are better handled through other routes. The following steps are a general checklist, not legal advice.

  1. Identify the government action. Ask who did it and under what authority: a law, a regulation, a policy, an officer’s decision. If the actor is private, the Charter probably does not apply, and you should look at employment, contract, privacy or human rights law.
  2. Identify the right and the harm. Write down which right you think was affected and how, in a few plain sentences. A section number is useful but not required.
  3. Keep evidence. Save documents, notices, emails, photographs, dates, names and badge numbers, and write your own account soon after the event. Courts decide on evidence, and memory fades.
  4. Get legal advice promptly. Deadlines can be short, and what you do in the first days can affect your options.
  5. Choose the right forum. Depending on the problem, the better route may be an internal appeal, administrative review, a human rights tribunal or commission, a privacy commissioner, an ombudsman, a police oversight body or a civil action. Where an administrative decision is involved, judicial review may be available, and Charter arguments can often be raised there.
  6. Watch limitation periods and filing deadlines. They vary by province and by type of proceeding, and some are very short. For example, an application for judicial review of a federal decision generally must be made within 30 days after the decision was first communicated, under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, although a judge may allow further time. Provincial judicial review and civil claims follow different rules. A lawyer can tell you which deadline applies to you.
  7. Consider interim relief carefully. If the harm is ongoing, a lawyer may be able to ask for an urgent order, but the test is demanding, the exact standard depends on the court and the kind of order, and the process can be expensive.
  8. Understand costs and remedies before you start. In most civil proceedings the losing party may be ordered to pay part of the winner’s costs. A declaration will not pay your expenses, and damages are not automatic.

Where help may be found

The organizations below do different things, and it helps to distinguish advocacy, public-interest litigation, funding and individual representation.

The Law Society of Ontario’s Referral Service, through findlegalhelp.ca, connects Ontario residents with a lawyer or paralegal for a free consultation of up to 30 minutes. It is a referral service and does not provide free representation.

The Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms says it provides legal representation to Canadians defending constitutional rights, but it reviews applications and does not take every case, so read its get help page before relying on it.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association works on advocacy and public-interest litigation, including the Emergencies Act appeal, and does not give legal advice to individuals or represent them. The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association similarly says it does not give legal advice, representation or referrals.

The Court Challenges Program funds test cases of national importance on certain Charter and official language rights. Its human rights funding is limited to challenges to federal laws, policies or practices, and it does not fund for-profit organizations. It is a funding program, not a source of individual representation or advice.

Provincial legal aid plans differ in who qualifies and what they cover. Eligibility is generally based on financial need, and coverage is often limited to certain kinds of matters, so check your own province’s plan.

Conclusion: Rights That Depend on Knowing How They Work

The Charter is real law with real effect. It has ended prohibitions, protected voting rights, shaped criminal procedure and, in Hillier, held a province to account for a limit on peaceful protest during an emergency. It is also a set of rights that bind particular actors, can be limited by government, and are enforced through slow, expensive and mostly retrospective processes. Both statements are true at once.

That is the working view of constitutional rights a self-reliant Canadian needs. Rights are meaningful protections against government authority, but they are neither absolute nor self-enforcing. Independent courts give them force, but judicial enforcement generally depends on someone bringing and pursuing a challenge, often at substantial cost, whether that person is an individual, a public-interest organization or a litigant supported by legal aid or pro bono counsel. A reader who understands the Charter is better placed to recognize when government action may exceed lawful authority, to tell a constitutional problem from a policy disagreement, to choose the right remedy, to count the real cost of defending a right, and to weigh a government’s claim that a restriction is necessary against what section 1 requires it to prove.

None of this is a reason for cynicism, since courts have limited governments. It is a reason to treat the Charter as one part of independence rather than the whole of it. Our articles on personal liberty in Canada and the components of personal sovereignty take up that wider question.

Primary sources

The Charter and the rest of the Constitution are available from the Government of Canada’s official consolidation. Court decisions are linked in the text from the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal and, where an official copy could not be linked, a published copy of the judgment. Litigation described as ongoing can change at any time, so check the Supreme Court’s docket for the file numbers named above (41231, 41979 and 42261). This article is general information and not legal advice.

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