CT REIT (TSX: CRT.UN) owns the land and buildings under Canadian Tire stores across the country and collects rent from them. It is a real estate investment trust, a structure that pays most of its income out to unitholders, and it does so monthly. Roughly nine dollars in every ten of its rent comes from Canadian Tire Corporation (CTC), the retailer that also owns about 68% of the trust. The leases are long, they carry contractual rent increases averaging about 1.5% a year, and the portfolio was 99.5% leased at September 30, 2026. For a Canadian looking for dependable monthly income with modest growth, that is an attractive description, and it is why CT REIT has a loyal following.
The business is dependable, but it is not risk-free. Canadian Tire is an investment-grade tenant, not a guaranteed one, and stores can close, relocate or come up for renewal. Very high occupancy is a strength, and it also leaves little room to improve. This article separates the quality of the business from the price paid for it, because the two can diverge. At CAD 18.32, the November 17, 2026 closing price, my modelled ten-year return is about 7.9% a year, below the 9.5% annualized nominal pre-tax hurdle I apply to Canadian equities. The units reach that hurdle at roughly CAD 16.26. My conclusion is that CT REIT is a good business at a full price.
A note on method. Every dollar figure is in Canadian dollars, labelled CAD. Figures from CT REIT’s third quarter report and Canadian Tire’s results are reported facts. The return model, the normalized earnings figure and the sensitivity tests are my own estimates, and they are labelled as such. Prices move daily, and the reference price is the latest close I could verify.
What CT REIT Owns and How It Makes Money
CT REIT was created in 2013 when Canadian Tire Corporation sold a large part of its owned real estate to a new trust and listed it. At September 30, 2026 the trust owned 381 properties and 31.9 million square feet of leasable area. Of the 380 properties earning rent, 265 are stand-alone Canadian Tire stores, 76 are multi-tenant centres anchored by a Canadian Tire store, 25 are other single-tenant buildings, 9 are other multi-tenant centres and 5 are industrial properties, and the trust owns 114 gas bars on those sites. By area, Ontario accounts for 39.2%, Western Canada 28.5%, Quebec 23.8% and Atlantic Canada 8.5%.
| Portfolio at September 30, 2026 | Value |
|---|---|
| Properties | 381 (380 earning rent, 1 under development) |
| Leasable area | 31.9 million square feet |
| Committed occupancy | 99.5% |
| Canadian Tire share of leasable area / annualized base rent | 92.0% / 90.5% |
| Investment-grade tenants, share of annualized base rent | 95.7% |
| Weighted average lease term | 6.7 years (6.9 years for Canadian Tire) |
| Fair value of investment properties | CAD 7.97 billion |
Source: CT REIT third quarter 2026 report to unitholders.
The way the trust makes money is simple. Most leases are net leases, meaning the tenant pays the operating costs, property taxes and insurance on top of base rent, so the landlord keeps most of the rent as income. Canadian Tire’s leases generally carry contractual increases of about 1.5% a year on average, according to the trust’s 2025 annual report. Income grows three ways: those built-in increases, higher rents when leases renew, and new space from acquisitions, intensifications and developments. In the first nine months of 2026, renewals of Canadian Tire stores came in 10.8% above the old rent on 658,179 square feet, and renewals across the whole portfolio averaged 9.1% on 993,950 square feet.
A landlord whose rents rise on a schedule, whose costs are passed through and whose buildings are full has a very predictable income stream. It also has a built-in ceiling on how quickly that stream can grow without new money, which matters when the question is what return an investor can expect.
The Canadian Tire Relationship
Everything about CT REIT, favourable and unfavourable, runs through its parent. CTC leases 92.0% of the area and 90.5% of the annualized base rent, and it paid CAD 142.6 million of the trust’s CAD 161.3 million of third-quarter property revenue, about 88%. It also holds a 67.9% effective interest in the trust, made up of 33,989,508 ordinary units and all 128,509,654 Class B limited partnership units. Class B units are a technical detail with practical effect. They are exchangeable one for one into ordinary units, and each carries a special voting unit, so for both ownership and votes they count as equity. The remaining 32% is the public float, roughly 76.8 million units.
Ownership is one relationship and lending is another. CTC also holds all of the trust’s Class C limited partnership units, CAD 1.45 billion in total, which the trust counts within its CAD 3.10 billion of total indebtedness and which pay a weighted average rate of 4.88%. That is about 47% of the trust’s debt, owed to its own controlling unitholder. CTC is the main tenant, the controlling owner and the largest lender, three roles that normally sit with different parties.
The 2025 annual information form sets out what that means in contract. A development agreement gives the trust preferential rights to participate in new CTC developments, and a right of first offer covers certain CTC properties. In the other direction, the trust must first offer CTC any CTC-occupied property it wants to sell or lease, and CTC has a right of first refusal to match a genuine competing offer for a CTC-leased property. A change of control right lets CTC buy CTC-leased properties at fair market value if a competitor acquires more than half the units while those properties are at least half the area. The non-competition arrangement leaves CTC free to own its own stores and land, but requires it to offer the trust a chance to participate when more than 20% of a property is rented to other tenants, and bars the trust from leasing to competing retailers without CTC’s consent.
While CTC holds a majority of the voting units, the trust also needs CTC’s written consent, at CTC’s sole discretion, for material acquisitions, dispositions and developments, for financings and refinancings, for granting security over assets and for replacing its chief executive. The same document says CTC, as a unitholder, has no duty to act in the trust’s best interest, and it warns that a sale of units by CTC could depress the price.
For a minority investor the arrangement cuts both ways. The advantages are real: a pipeline of properties and developments, a tenant with every incentive to keep stores in place, and an investment-grade rating that Morningstar DBRS ties explicitly to CTC’s, because CTC effectively controls the trust and is its largest tenant. The disadvantages are the other side of the same facts. Outside unitholders own a third of a company whose strategy, financing and takeover prospects are set by its largest tenant. They are paid by the monthly distribution and by growth in the trust’s value, and the structure makes a takeover premium unlikely. None of this makes the arrangement hostile. It does mean that CTC’s financial strength supports the trust’s credit but does not guarantee what a buyer of the units will earn, since that depends on the price paid.
How the Business Is Performing
The third-quarter results were strong. Property revenue rose 6.7% to CAD 161.3 million and net operating income, the rent left after property costs, rose 8.5% to CAD 130.1 million. Adjusted funds from operations (AFFO) per unit rose 7.7% to CAD 0.337. AFFO is the measure real estate investors watch most closely. It starts with funds from operations, which adds back the non-cash effect of property revaluations and depreciation, and then subtracts the capital spending needed to keep buildings in good shape and the leasing costs of keeping them rented. It is a closer proxy for distributable cash than net income, which swings with property valuations.
Two adjustments matter before treating the quarter as a trend. The quarter included CAD 2.49 million of lease surrender revenue, a one-time payment received when a tenant ends a lease early. Excluding it, my arithmetic puts third-quarter AFFO per unit at about CAD 0.327, up 4.3% rather than 7.7%, and nine-month AFFO per unit at about CAD 0.980, up about 3.2% on the restated 2025 comparative of CAD 0.949 rather than the reported 4.3%. According to published summaries of the earnings call, the surrender related mainly to the Kelowna property, where Canadian Tire moved to a newly built store nearby, and management does not expect more such revenue through the rest of 2026 or into 2027. I could not read the transcript itself, so this is a secondary report. The second adjustment is that CT REIT has restated its 2025 comparatives using a normalized estimate of maintenance capital spending, now CAD 36.0 million a year, up CAD 3.0 million from earlier estimates. Reported 2025 AFFO per unit was CAD 1.274 on a diluted basis, and the older figures were CAD 1.239 for 2024 and CAD 1.203 for 2023. Those three figures are on the same original basis and imply growth of about 2.9% a year. The comparisons between 2026 and 2025 use the restated basis.
My normalized estimate for 2026 AFFO per unit is CAD 1.31. That is the CAD 0.990 reported for nine months, less about CAD 0.010 for the one-time surrender, plus a fourth quarter I assume near CAD 0.327, about equal to the third quarter excluding the surrender. It is an editorial estimate, not guidance. It is consistent with nine-month AFFO growth of about 3.2% excluding the surrender, and with the trust’s pattern: same-store net operating income, the cleanest measure of organic growth, rose 2.4% in the quarter and 1.6% over nine months.
Growth beyond built-in rent increases comes from development. At September 30 the pipeline covered up to 557,000 square feet, 86.9% committed, at a total cost of CAD 390.7 million, with CAD 175.7 million still to be spent and about CAD 76 million due within twelve months. The largest is Canada Square in Toronto, an office retrofit in which the trust holds a half interest, due for completion in the fourth quarter of 2028. The building totals roughly 680,000 square feet, of which Canadian Tire will lease about 550,000 for 21 years. The development table shows only the trust’s half share, 340,000 square feet, of which 310,000 is committed. The two sets of figures describe the same project on different bases.
Costs are moving the wrong way at the margin. The higher maintenance capital estimate trims AFFO, adjusted general and administrative expense rose to 2.8% of property revenue from 2.5%, and interest costs have absorbed part of the gain in net operating income.
Monthly Distributions and Their Sustainability
CT REIT pays CAD 0.0818 a month, or CAD 0.9816 a year, after a 3.5% increase that took effect with the July 2026 payment. The earlier rate, from July 2025, was CAD 0.94836 a year. The annualized rate at the 2013 listing was about CAD 0.65, so it has risen about 51% in thirteen years, and the trust states its distribution has grown at a 3.3% compound annual rate since listing. At CAD 18.32 the distribution yield is 5.4%.
Coverage is conservative. The AFFO payout ratio, the share of AFFO paid out as distributions, was 72.7% in the third quarter and for the nine months. On my normalized AFFO of CAD 1.31, the payout is about 75%. That leaves roughly CAD 80 million of retained cash this year, by my estimate, which is close to the CAD 76 million of development spending due over the next twelve months. Growth is therefore largely funded from retained cash rather than by issuing units. The unit count, including Class B units, rose by 1,180,490 in the first nine months, exactly the number issued through the distribution reinvestment plan and related programs, so the trust did not sell units to the public.
Increases have been steady rather than generous: 2.5% in 2025 and 3.5% in 2026. For valuation purposes, distribution growth of approximately 2% to 4% annually is a reasonable working assumption, provided AFFO continues to grow and the payout ratio remains conservative.
Debt, Refinancing and Interest Rates
The debt is long, mostly fixed-rate and mostly unsecured, and a large share is owed to the parent.
| Balance sheet at September 30, 2026 | Value |
|---|---|
| Total indebtedness | CAD 3.10 billion |
| Class C units held by CTC / debentures | CAD 1.45 billion / about CAD 1.53 billion |
| Indebtedness ratio (covenant maximum 60%) | 38.7%, down from 39.8% at year-end |
| Total indebtedness to EBITFV | 6.49 times, down from 6.77 times |
| Interest coverage, third quarter | 3.56 times |
| Weighted average interest rate / term | 4.44% / 4.2 years |
| Fixed-rate share of debt | about 96% |
| Unencumbered properties | CAD 7.95 billion, 99.2% of total assets |
| Liquidity | CAD 304.4 million |
Source: CT REIT third quarter 2026 report. The weighted average rate and term exclude credit facilities. The debenture figure is my sum of the maturity table.
By real estate standards this is a clean balance sheet. Nearly every property is unencumbered and leverage fell during the year as property values rose. Morningstar DBRS rates the trust BBB with a stable trend, aligned with CTC’s own BBB rating. The last confirmation I could verify was dated June 19, 2025, and the agency said a downgrade of CTC would lead it to consider a negative action on the trust.
The weak point is the maturity ladder, because maturing debt has to be replaced at today’s rates. Debentures of CAD 175 million at 3.47% and CAD 200 million at 3.87% mature in 2027. In 2028 CAD 250 million at 5.83% and a CAD 200 million Class C series at 4.50% come due, and in 2029 CAD 250 million at 3.03% and a CAD 200 million Class C series at 5.43%. A benchmark for replacement cost is the CAD 300 million of Series K debentures at 4.36% maturing in December 2031, issued in the first nine months of 2026.
I tested what refinancing does to AFFO. This is an editorial scenario, not management guidance. It covers only the tranches listed above, CAD 1.275 billion in total, and assumes each is replaced dollar for dollar at a single rate.
If the maturing debt is replaced at 4.0%, annual interest falls by about CAD 4.8 million by 2029, adding about 1.5% to AFFO. At 4.6%, close to the 2026 issue, interest rises by about CAD 2.8 million and AFFO falls by under 1%. At 5.4%, interest rises by about CAD 13.0 million, or CAD 0.054 per unit, and AFFO falls by more than 4%, which would absorb more than a year of normal growth.
Interest rates affect the trust in three separate ways. First is refinancing, as the table shows. Second is property valuation: the trust’s appraisals use a weighted average discount rate of 7.26% and a terminal capitalization rate of 6.75%, and higher rates lower the values that feed reported net asset value. Third is the yield investors demand. A unit with a 5.4% distribution yield competes with a government bond, and when bond yields rise, the price of the units tends to fall to restore the gap. The Bank of Canada raised its policy rate by 25 basis points to 2.5% on October 28, 2026, its first increase since July 2023. The Government of Canada 10-year benchmark yield was 3.80% on November 18, after a recent low of 3.63% on November 9. The distribution yield is about 1.6 points above that benchmark.
On liquidity, the trust has CAD 298.6 million undrawn on a committed bank facility maturing in May 2031, plus a CAD 300 million uncommitted facility from CTC, automatically renewed for 2026 according to the trust’s report. CTC could decline to renew it, but only CAD 120.4 million is drawn.
Canadian Tire’s Financial Health
Because CTC is nearly the entire rent roll, its health matters. Its third quarter release covers the quarter ended October 3, 2026, three days after the trust’s, and the results were good. Retail sales rose 4.4% to CAD 4,742.8 million, retail comparable sales rose 3.2%, and normalized diluted earnings per share were CAD 4.27, against CAD 3.78 a year earlier. CTC raised its annual dividend to CAD 7.30 per share from CAD 7.20. Its release also records CAD 39.9 million of distributions from its CT REIT stake in the quarter, so the parent is also a large recipient of the trust’s cash.
The outlook is less settled. According to the Canadian Press report on the earnings call, management expected value-focused consumer behaviour to last another year to 18 months and described a slower start to October. A soft year at Canadian Tire would hurt the retailer’s profits long before it threatened a lease payment, because rent is a small, fixed cost in a large, cyclical business. That asymmetry is why the trust’s credit rating tracks its parent’s, and why the more relevant risk is a change in store networks. When Canadian Tire moves a store, as it did in Kelowna, the trust can gain a redevelopment opportunity, but the old site can also be re-let at a lower rent or stay empty for a time.
What CT REIT Is Worth
Three yardsticks give a rough answer, and none is exact.
| Valuation at CAD 18.32 | Value |
|---|---|
| Market capitalization (239.27 million units) | CAD 4.38 billion |
| Distribution yield | 5.4% |
| AFFO yield on normalized CAD 1.31 | 7.2% |
| Price to normalized AFFO | 14.0 times |
| Reported net asset value per unit | CAD 19.27 |
| Price to net asset value | 0.95 times (5% discount) |
| Implied capitalization rate at market price (my estimate) | about 7.0% |
| Rate implied by the trust’s carrying values (my estimate) | about 6.6% |
Source: CT REIT third quarter 2026 report for net asset value, debt and net operating income; the November 17, 2026 close from TipRanks historical prices; my calculations for the rest. The capitalization rates divide annualized third-quarter net operating income, excluding the surrender revenue, by market capitalization plus debt less the development property, or by the carrying value of the operating properties.
Net asset value (NAV) is the trust’s estimate of what its properties are worth after debt, divided by units. Reported NAV is total equity of CAD 4,611 million over 239.27 million units, or CAD 19.27, up from CAD 18.53 at year-end 2025 and CAD 16.34 at the end of 2023. It rests on discount rates, capitalization rates and an 11-year hold assumption, with about 80% of the portfolio by value appraised externally over a four-year cycle. It is not a guaranteed sale value, and appraisals can differ from what a buyer would pay.
The trust’s own sensitivity table shows how much rests on those rates. Raising the terminal capitalization and discount rates together by 25 basis points would lower the fair value of the properties by CAD 276 million, about CAD 1.15 per unit or 6% of NAV. Lowering them by the same amount would add CAD 296 million. I do not extend that to larger moves, since the relationship is not exactly linear and the trust does not disclose a larger case.
The units trade 5% below reported NAV, which looks like a margin of safety, but NAV is built on valuations that move with the same interest rates that move the unit price, so the discount is a weaker cushion than it appears. The price has also already re-rated. The close of CAD 18.32 compares with about CAD 16.27 at the end of 2025, a gain of about 13%, and puts the units at 14.0 times normalized AFFO, against about 12.8 times at the end of 2025. At the reference price, investors are already paying for the stability.
Ten-Year Return Scenarios
To compare CT REIT with a 9.5% hurdle I built a ten-year model with three scenarios. Each scenario assumes an investor buys at the reference price, receives distributions every year and sells the units at the end of year ten. AFFO per unit starts at CAD 1.31 and grows at a set rate, the distribution starts at CAD 0.9816 and grows at the same rate, and the sale price equals a chosen multiple of AFFO in 2036. Returns are pre-tax and assume the units are held in a registered account.
I assign the bear, base and bull scenarios probabilities of 25%, 50% and 25%. To produce one expected return, I do not average the three scenario returns. Instead, for each of the ten years I multiply each scenario’s cash flow by its probability and add the results, which produces a single expected cash-flow stream, and I then solve for the annual return that stream earns on the purchase price. This values each dollar by when it arrives and gives the return on the average outcome. Averaging the three scenario returns instead gives 7.7%, close but not identical.
| Scenario | Probability | AFFO and distribution growth | Exit multiple of AFFO | Return at CAD 18.32 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | 1.0% a year | 11.0 times | 4.5% |
| Base | 50% | 3.0% a year | 13.0 times | 7.8% |
| Bull | 25% | 4.5% a year | 15.0 times | 10.5% |
| Expected cash flows | 7.9% |
Source: my model. Growth is anchored to the 2.9% AFFO growth of 2023 to 2025 and the 3.3% distribution growth since listing. Exit multiples are anchored to 12.8 times at the end of 2025 and 14.0 times today.
The expected return is 7.9% a year, about 1.6 points short of the hurdle. The base case, which assumes growth slightly above the last three years and some multiple compression from today’s 14.0 times to 13.0 times, earns 7.8%. The bear case, with 1% growth and an 11 times exit, still earns 4.5% because the distribution continues throughout. A harsher test outside the weights, with AFFO falling 1% a year, a frozen distribution and a ten times exit, still returns about 2.2% a year. The distributions provide a substantial portion of the modelled total return, although they cannot eliminate the risk of capital losses or guarantee a positive return. The weights matter less than the multiple: shifting the weights toward the bear case, to 35%, 45% and 20%, lowers the expected return to about 7.4%, and shifting them toward the bull case, to 20%, 45% and 35%, raises it to about 8.3%.
To reach 9.5% from CAD 18.32 with a 13 times exit, AFFO and distributions would need to grow about 4.7% a year, or about 4.1% if the multiple stayed at today’s 14.0 times. Both are above the trust’s record of 2.9% on AFFO and 3.3% on distributions. Reaching them would require acquisitions and intensifications that outrun rising capital spending and interest costs, which is possible but is not what the history shows.
A CAD 10,000 purchase at CAD 18.32 buys about 546 units. In the base case, with no reinvestment of distributions, those units would be worth about CAD 12,500 after ten years and would have paid about CAD 6,200 in cumulative cash distributions, for a total of about CAD 18,700. The bear case gives about CAD 8,700 in unit value plus CAD 5,600 in distributions, and the bull case about CAD 16,700 plus CAD 6,700.
Where Canadians Should Hold CT REIT
A registered account is the natural home, because of how REIT distributions are taxed. Canadian REIT distributions can carry several tax characters: other income, capital gains, return of capital and, for some issuers, eligible dividends. The split is decided by each trust and reported on the T3 slip, and it changes from year to year. CT REIT’s taxation page shows 91.78% of its 2025 distributions as other income, 0.43% as capital gains and 7.80% as return of capital, with no eligible dividend component listed. For 2024 the split was about 95.2% other income, 4.8% capital gains and almost no return of capital. Other income is taxed at the full marginal rate with no dividend tax credit, which is different from the treatment described in the guide to dividend taxation in Canada. Return of capital is not taxed when received but lowers the adjusted cost base, which leaves a larger capital gain when the units are sold.
In a TFSA distributions and gains grow tax-free, and in an RRSP tax is deferred until withdrawal, a choice covered in RRSP versus TFSA. In a non-registered account the cost is significant. Applying CT REIT’s 2025 split at the top Ontario marginal rate of 53.53% to my base case, the 7.8% pre-tax return falls to about 4.5%. That is an illustration at one rate and one year’s allocation, not a forecast. The units are a Canadian asset, so there is no foreign withholding tax and no T1135 reporting.
Investors who would rather not select individual REITs can consider diversified Canadian REIT exchange-traded funds, including equal-weight strategies that spread exposure across multiple property owners. Such funds can reduce dependence on a single tenant or management team, although they introduce management fees and retain exposure to the broader real estate sector. See the guides to REITs versus direct real estate and to private REITs and real estate syndicates. The parent’s loyalty program is covered from the customer’s side in the guide to Canadian Tire Money and Triangle Rewards.
Risks and What Could Change the Thesis
Five risks matter most.
Concentration comes first. With 90.5% of base rent from one tenant, the trust is a credit exposure to Canadian Tire with real estate attached. A relocated or closed store can leave a hole that a replacement tenant fills only at a lower rent or after a delay, and a downgrade of CTC would raise the trust’s borrowing costs.
Interest rates come second. They act through refinancing, property valuations and the yield investors require, and the Bank of Canada has just started raising its policy rate.
Control is third. CTC holds 67.9% of the equity and can block or shape major financings and transactions. The minority owner depends on the distribution and on growth, not on a takeover premium.
Spending is fourth. Maintenance capital is higher than planned, development spending of about CAD 176 million remains, and the Canada Square office retrofit is the riskiest project in the pipeline.
The multiple is the fifth and least obvious. At 14.0 times AFFO the units are priced for stability, and the cost of being wrong about the multiple is larger than the cost of being wrong about growth. In my sensitivity grid at the reference price, with growth of 3%, moving the exit multiple from 13 to 11 times lowers the return from 7.8% to 6.5%, a loss of 1.3 points, about the same as cutting growth by 1.3 points. Most of these risks are manageable, but a manageable list of risks priced at 14 times AFFO is not a margin of safety.
Several developments would change my view. A fall in the unit price toward the hurdle price would improve the arithmetic, and evidence that AFFO per unit can grow above 4% a year without issuing equity would support a higher growth assumption. A weaker CTC credit, a payout ratio nearing 85% or a large sale of units by CTC would worsen the picture.
Investment Verdict and Attractive Entry Prices
CT REIT is three different things, and each needs its own verdict. As a business, it is among the most predictable real estate companies in Canada: a portfolio that is 99.5% leased, contractual rent increases, a payout near 73%, a clean balance sheet and a tenant that keeps paying more to renew. As an income investment it is solid, a 5.4% yield that I would expect to grow 2% to 4% a year, with monthly payments that suit a TFSA or RRSP. As a return engine against a 9.5% hurdle it falls short at the reference price, with an expected return of about 7.9% a year.
The price that would satisfy the hurdle comes from the same model. These bands use the expected cash-flow method and today’s AFFO base, and they need to be recalculated as AFFO grows.
| Band | Price (CAD per unit) | Distribution yield | Price to AFFO | Expected ten-year return |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Compelling | Below about 14.60 | Above 6.7% | Below 11.1 times | 11% or more |
| Attractive entry | 14.60 to 16.25 | 6.0% to 6.7% | 11.1 to 12.4 times | 9.5% to 11% |
| Fair value | 16.25 to 18.15 | 5.4% to 6.0% | 12.4 to 13.9 times | 8.0% to 9.5% |
| Full | 18.15 to 19.55 | 5.0% to 5.4% | 13.9 to 14.9 times | 7.0% to 8.0% |
| Expensive | Above about 19.55 | Below 5.0% | Above 14.9 times | Below 7% |
Source: my model, using the November 17, 2026 reference price and normalized 2026 AFFO of CAD 1.31.
At CAD 18.32 the units sit at the lower edge of the full band, and the hurdle price of about CAD 16.26 is 11% lower. The 9.5% hurdle is met only at or below that level. Above CAD 19.55, where the modelled expected return falls below 7%, the units would also trade above the reported NAV of CAD 19.27. At that valuation, investors would be paying a premium for the stability of the income stream while accepting a relatively modest expected total return.
The model carries an error of at least a point or two. The largest single driver, interest rates, is one that professionals forecast poorly, and the scenarios and weights are judgments, not facts. These conclusions rest on the evidence I could verify at the reference date and would change if CT REIT’s earnings, Canadian Tire’s credit or the price changed materially. If you are weighing a single REIT against index funds, start with the guide to ETFs versus mutual funds versus individual stocks. For a similar bond-like profile from regulated businesses, see the comparison of Canadian utility stocks.
This article is general information and my own opinion, not personalized investment, tax or legal advice. Investment models are estimates, not forecasts. Consider your own circumstances or consult a licensed adviser before acting.
